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improved by taking full advantage of
the computer and telecommunications
advances made over the last half-
century. Friedman challenges NWCW
proponents by redefining their central
arguments about the relationship be-
tween nodes and networks. In effect, he
argues that the “picture” is more im-
portant than the network itself for con-
ducting military operations. The
network serves the development of ever
more complex and, presumably, accu-
rate “pictures” available to operators
and analysts.
If I have a problem with Friedman, it is
with his definition and explanation of
network-centric warfare, at least the
variant espoused by Vice Admiral
Cebrowski. (Full disclosure: Vice Admi-
ral Cebrowski was the president of the
Naval War College when I was hired
there, and I enjoyed more than a few
hours hashing out the intricacies of
network-centric warfare in his pres-
ence.) I do not agree that picture-
centric warfare is equivalent to
network-centric warfare: the “pictures”
highlighted by Friedman constitute
only one dimension (albeit an impor-
tant one) of the theory and practice of
network-centric warfare. Another rela-
tively minor quibble is that although
the book’s title refers to three world
wars, and indeed the narrative contains
analysis and examples from all
three—World War I, World War II,
and the Cold War—this is somewhat
misleading. As the table of contents
suggests, the real structure underlying
the work is instead three technological
eras, those associated with radios, radar,
and computers.
Network-centric Warfare is not an easy
read. It is filled with jargon and focuses
largely on relatively obscure develop-
ments. It is not a popular history or an
anecdote-filled volume designed to
thrill devotees of warfare. It lists nearly
fourteen pages of acronyms!
These complaints aside, this book is
worth buying, reading, and studying. It
is a most useful corrective to histories
focusing on specific wars, campaigns,




Finkelstein, Sydney, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew
Campbell. Think Again: Why Good Leaders Make
Bad Decisions and How to Keep It from Happening
to You. Boston: Harvard Business School, 2008.
204pp. $27.95
Bad decisions are common, but bad de-
cisions by good leaders are perplexing.
This book delves into the root causes of
faulty decisions made by leaders who
should have known better. The reader
will be intrigued by the cognitive dy-
namics underlying defective decisions.
Neuroscience is making aspects of tra-
ditional wisdom about decision making
obsolete. It turns out that rational deci-
sion making is not really all that
rational.
The book’s lead author, Sydney
Finkelstein, teaches at Tuck School of
Business, Dartmouth, and has written ex-
tensively on leadership. His coauthors
both earned their MBAs at Harvard and
teach at the Strategic Management Center
at Ashridge Business School, outside Lon-
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The authors identify two common
components in the flawed decisions
they studied: judgment error and the
absence of a corrective process. One ex-
ample given is the case of Matthew
Broderick, a retired Marine Corps gen-
eral who was a seasoned decision maker
in the Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s Operations Center during
Hurricane Katrina. His experience had
taught him that initial reports from a
crisis area are often exaggerated and in-
accurate. Twelve hours after the hurri-
cane hit New Orleans, Broderick
received conflicting information about
breached levees and extensive flooding.
His rational analysis was that the sit-
uation was not dire, and he went
home. By the following morning,
the magnitude of the catastrophe was
unequivocal.
Broderick was a competent leader with
proven crisis experience, so why did he
assign great validity to one source of in-
formation while dismissing data from
other credible sources? The authors
contend that his misjudgment resulted
from two cognitive errors: he incor-
rectly assumed that the Katrina situa-
tion “pattern-matched” his prior crisis
experiences; and he exacerbated the er-
ror by “emotionally tagging” the infor-
mation from his preferred source, the
Army Corps of Engineers. Pattern rec-
ognition and emotional tagging are
powerful subconscious influences on
decision making.
Based on the authors’ research, four
“red flag conditions” are evident in de-
fective decisions: misleading experi-
ences, misleading prejudgments,
inappropriate self-interest, and inap-
propriate attachments. A red-flag con-
dition forecasts vulnerability to
cognitive bias. Notable examples of
flawed decisions made by exceptional
military, business, and government
leaders richly illustrate the latent peril
in red-flag conditions.
The elements at play are subtle and sub-
conscious. For example, the persistent
tug of personal self-interest is hard to
detect, because a self-serving bias is im-
plicitly acceptable in our culture.
Self-interest becomes inappropriate
when it is unacknowledged and there is
no self-awareness. It corrosively distorts
the decision process. The authors’ re-
search found that inappropriate self-
interest contributed to flawed strategic
decisions in more than two-thirds of
their research cases.
The book is repetitive at times, but that
minor distraction is more than offset
by its insightful advice and practical
decision-process safeguards. The au-
thors refer extensively to academic
cognitive research and challenge the
invincibility of “rational and analytic”
decision making, especially for leaders




Horner, Charles. Rising China and Its Postmodern
Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context.
Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 2009. 224pp.
$34.95
This book connects China’s past, pres-
ent, and future and places them in a
larger, evolving context. Horner’s work
is nothing short of a tour de force of
world intellectual history as projected
and contested on the canvas that is
China. Eloquent and engaging, it is
pointed without being overly
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